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Introduction
It is 10:00 a.m., and Paul Davidson is telling
the assembled economists how to pull rabbits
out of a hat. Metaphorically, of course: Profes-
sor Davidson was discussing the assumptions
behind a thought-provoking paper presented
at the Conference on Credit Allocation: The-
ory, Evidence, and History, held last October
17-19 in Cleveland.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and
the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking spon-
sored this conference to support research into
the costs, causes, and consequences of credit al-
location by the federal government.
1 It is one of
those peculiar paradoxes that federal credit alloca-
tion remains an esoteric topic despite the general
familiarity with student loans, deposit insurance,
and the Federal Reserve's influence on interest
rates. The conference aimed to bring together an
emerging body of work that looks at these issues
from the standpoint of modern economics, empha-
sizing both common concerns and methodologi-
cal differences to highlight an area that deserves
greater attention.
• 1 The full proceedings appear in the August 1994 issue of the Jour-
nal ot Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 26, no. 3, part 2.
In a world of scarce resources, something
must allocate credit, be it the marketplace or
the government. In a perfect world, prices are
the most efficient method of accomplishing
this. In a world with market imperfections,
including significant information costs, the gov-
ernment might improve upon the market allo-
cation system. However, public choice theory
reminds us that government imperfections can
lead to credit market intervention that reduces
society's welfare. Therefore, it is important that
we understand the nature of the market imper-
fections and the alternative solutions.
Understanding the actual effects — intended
or otherwise — of particular programs is per-
haps the most important immediate goal. But
in thinking about the future, and in removing
the prejudice about what seems "natural" or
"politically feasible," both critical theory and
historical studies have a place.
The papers reviewed here were grouped
into three sessions at the conference. The first
presented a general overview of the problem
by examining the broad rationales for credit al-
location: abstract market defects and the con-
crete historical record. The second session took
a closer look at specific programs and regula-
tions. Housing, bank capital requirements, andcommunity reinvestment were examined analyti-
cally, empirically, and as the outcome of a political
process. The third session focused on a number
of issues related to pensions and federal pension
guarantees. The sheer amount of money tied up
in pensions makes the consequences of inept
policy particularly severe — and the need for re-
search correspondingly great.
I. Session 1: What
Can Be, Might Be
Stephen Williamson first examines whether infor-
mation problems justify government credit alloca-
tion. Ronnie Phillips then looks at the debate
over credit allocation during the New Deal, when
many current programs were first introduced and
many more radical proposals were seriously con-
sidered. Finally, Marvin Goodfriend stresses the
credit allocation inherent in current Federal Re-
serve and Treasury practices. Taken together, the
papers produce a strong sense of "what can be,
might be" — for better or worse.
Williamson
In "Do Informational Frictions Justify Federal
Credit Programs?" Stephen Williamson evaluates
the effectiveness of government credit programs
using two models with imperfect information.
In these models, informational frictions lead to
a credit market with many realistic features,
such as bonds, banks, and bad borrowers, and
with flaws, such as credit rationing.
The first model looks at an economy where
people must bear a cost to learn the true state
of the world. (These models are hence known
as "costly state verification" models.) This pro-
vides a motivation for debt and for credit ra-
tioning. Increasing the interest rate on a loan,
for example, reduces the chance that the bor-
rower will make those higher payments and
thus boosts the expected verification costs. This
rations some borrowers out of the market, be-
cause offering to pay a higher interest rate will
not get banks to lend to them. The market
treats identical borrowers differently; some get
credit and some do not, even though the over-
all return on their investment would exceed
the market interest rate.
The apparent market flaw, however, does
not immediately imply that a governmental solu-
tion exists. Williamson shows that if the govern-
ment credit program breaks even, neither lenders
nor borrowers profit. Consider a credit guarantee
program that the government funds by charg-
ing lenders an insurance premium. With a hike
in the interest rate, the bank does not bear the
full increased cost of default directly, so banks
overall charge a higher rate. They do bear the
higher cost in the form of heftier insurance pre-
miums, however, so their expected return can
fall. Borrowers then face a steeper interest rate,
while lenders get a lower expected return. This
lower return means that lenders supply less
capital and credit rationing gets worse. In other
words, everybody loses.
The second model looks at a market where
lenders must screen out bad borrowers. As
lenders deny some borrowers credit, the gov-
ernment has a potential concern. As in the first
model, however, subtle perverse effects arise
from government credit allocation. Without
government intervention, lower-quality borrow-
ers, who face higher interest rates, never try to
pass themselves off as high-quality borrowers
because, if discovered, they get no loan at all.
If the government offers loans to people who
have been denied credit, it decreases the pen-
alty for those who misrepresent their type. This
in turn raises lenders' screening costs, exacer-
bating the credit problem as more resources
get used up in overhead and fewer are avail-
able for borrowing.
On one level, Williamson's results may seem
obvious: An unfettered market provides the
best possible contracts for borrowing and lend-
ing. More important, the paper rebuts the oft-
heard charge that market imperfections create
a need for government intervention. William-
son goes well beyond such general issues,
however, and shows that government interven-
tion is not only unnecessary but also may
prove harmful.
Paul Davidson criticizes the entire tradition be-
hind the Williamson paper, that of classical theo-
retical economics. For example, he points out
and questions the statistical assumptions regard-
ing risk that allow inferences about future default
rates.
2 Davidson also questions the model's infor-
mational assumptions: Could private markets effi-
ciently uncover the information and replace the
implicit insurance of banks with an explicit form?
Is it true that individuals know their default risk
better than lenders do?
• 2 Technically speaking, the stochastic process must be ergodic,
with the time average of past values converging to the phase average
across states (see Breiman [1968], chapter 6). Strictly speaking, William-
son avoids this problem because agents in this model have direct knowl-
edge of the relevant probabilities. In actual practice, however, people must
learn this from experience, which again raises the question of ergodicity.The Davidson critique boils down to two cen-
tral concerns: 1) Which assumptions best capture
the real world (that is, do credit market imperfec-
tions arise from imperfect information [William-
son] or non-ergodicity [Davidson]), and 2) What
vital elements has Williamson left out (competing
lenders? multiple loans?). These are hard ques-
tions that are well worth thinking about, but the
Williamson paper, by clearly and cleverly drawing
conclusions from a well-specified set of assump-
tions, survives the criticism as one important way
to proceed.
Pure logic cannot settle such disputes. Em-
pirical evidence can't either, but it can help.
Recent work by Berger and Udell (1992) finds
little evidence of credit rationing. The classic
work of Ellsberg (1961) indicates that people's
perception of risk may be based more on the
fear of a vague "uncertainty" than on a statisti-
cal calculation of probabilities.
Phillips
In "An End to Private Banking: Early New Deal
Proposals to Alter the Role of the Federal Gov-
ernment in Credit Allocation," Ronnie Phillips
documents that the financial reformers of the
early New Deal had a list of concerns that are
still voiced in policy circles today. Banks taking
on riskier loans to increase profits, excessively
harsh bank exams, small businesses starved for
loans, Federal Reserve accountability, and the
incentive effects of deposit insurance were only
some of the topics the reformers considered. Not
surprisingly, many policy prescriptions of that era
also look familiar, encompassing narrow banks,
a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and
changes in the Fed's discount window policy.
Phillips describes how the politicians and
economists of the time clearly understood the
important distinction between money and
credit. Credit is the transfer of real resources
from lenders to borrowers; money is the means
of payment, or the medium of exchange. The
proposals seriously considered 100 percent re-
serve banking, establishing small mutual savings
associations for local lending, and extensions of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to allo-
cate credit globally among local associations
and between larger corporations. One set of
lessons from the New Deal debates that de-
serves more emphasis is the objections people
had to the proposals — the fear of political
control, evidence of ineffectiveness, and lack
of specific objectives.
A less direct lesson concerns the importance
of history and the path-dependent nature of
economic experience. Phillips strongly sug-
gests that a series of historical accidents lay be-
hind the New Deal's rejection of the proposals
to separate money and credit. Roosevelt's fail-
ure to consult Senator Carter Glass before ap-
pointing Marriner Eccles to the Federal Reserve
chairmanship led to Glass' obstructing key re-
forms. A prominent senator supporting the re-
forms, Bronson Cutting of Nevada, died in a
plane crash before the measures could be put
to a vote. These facts strongly suggest that our
current system has arbitrary components and
deserves a fresh look.
Walker Todd's discussion heightens the rele-
vance of the historical perspective provided by
Phillips. He brings out the larger political econ-
omy issues framing the 1930s' debate, showing
how the early New Deal reforms were opposed
both by those advocating increased government
involvement and by traditional fiscal conserva-
tives. The continuing importance of these
strands of thought means, paradoxically, that
the historical record can provide a useful com-
mentary on current proposals.
Goodfriend
Marvin Goodfriend provides a natural follow-
up to the history lesson, arguing persuasively
that we live with the adverse consequences of
not facing up to the distinction between money
and credit. In "Why We Need an 'Accord' for
Federal Reserve Credit Policy," he suggests ex-
tending the 1951 Fed-Treasury accord, which
eliminated the central bank's commitment to
support government bond prices. Goodfriend
similarly wants to free current Fed credit opera-
tions from potential abuse because of concerns
over fiscal policy.
The author defines monetary policy as a
change in the stock of high-powered money,
while credit policy is a change in the central
bank's assets that keeps the stock of high-
powered money fixed. In his view, an effec-
tive central bank should not be distracted by
entanglements peripheral to its mission. The
accord of 1951 effectively freed Federal Re-
serve monetary policy from entanglement with
fiscal problems, but the necessary credit ac-
tions of the central bank (especially as the
lender of last resort) currently have little or no
protection. Applying three basic principles
would provide such protection: Limit assis-
tance to illiquid but solvent institutions, do notuse credit policy to avoid congressional author-
ization of funding, and do not directly transfer
Fed surplus to the Treasury.
Applying these rules would have some non-
trivial implications. Quite clearly, it would pre-
vent discount window lending from delaying
the closure of insolvent banks (see Todd [1988,
19931). Less obviously, it would also affect for-
eign exchange intervention. When the Federal
Reserve buys German marks, for example, it
acquires international reserves that increase the
money supply; this constitutes monetary pol-
icy. But usually, the Fed acts to "sterilize" the
intervention, offsetting the increase in reserves
by selling domestic securities: Sterilized inter-
vention thus constitutes credit policy. Good-
friend wants this type of intervention to be
subject to explicit congressional authorization.
Similarly, he believes that Congress should
authorize "warehousing," wherein the Fed
buys foreign currency from the Treasury and
agrees to sell it back at some point in the fu-
ture. In both cases, managing the balance-of-
payment deficits constitutes proper fiscal
policy actions of the U.S. government. Central
bank activity obscures the funding process and
would fall under the proposed accord.
The "credit accord" would also stop the
transfer of Federal Reserve surplus to the Treas-
ury (authorized by the Deficit Reduction Act of
1993)- The Fed surplus is part of its capital ac-
count and represents retained earnings. Tradi-
tionally, the central bank has maintained a
surplus account equal to paid-in capital. Good-
friend explains how the transfer, which the Fed
finances by selling Treasury securities in its
portfolio, results in no actual deficit reduction
in the long ain. That's because once the securi-
ties are sold to the public, the Fed no longer
remits to the Treasury any interest earned on
Treasury securities. Over time, the loss of this
revenue offsets the surplus transferred.
E.J. Stevens' discussion traces the problems
that Goodfriend seeks to resolve to an even
deeper source: the lack of clear objectives for
Federal Reserve policy. Given a pessimism
about any near-term change in this situation,
an accord may serve as a second-best way to
extricate the central bank from inappropriate
transactions. This immediately raises two ques-
tions: Which transactions are inappropriate,
and who should be party to the accord?
Stevens argues that in most cases, the Fed is
not the most appropriate party to the accord.
Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), an accord al-
ready exists limiting Fed lending to insolvent
institutions; thus, a tune-up may be desired, but
is a major reform in order? Likewise, the Treasury
and Congress can by themselves refrain from us-
ing the Fed for underhanded financing, be it by
foreign exchange warehousing or the transfer
of surplus funds.
Ultimately, the issue is that while Congress
and the Treasury may not want a commitment to
avoid entangling the Fed, the Fed may desire
such a commitment. It really does dieters no
good to know that if all ice cream manufacturers
voluntarily ceased production, they could stay
thin. The more difficult issue that Goodfriend
and Stevens wrestle with is the actual importance
of the particular problems Goodfriend cites.
II. Session 2:
Specific Programs
The second session of the conference looks at
specific government programs in more detail. Al-
len Berger and Greg Udell evaluate risk-based
capital requirements for banks. Since such re-
quirements alter the relative cost of funding for
different types of assets, the policy may have
credit allocation consequences. Charles Calomiris,
Charles Kahn, and Stanley Longhofer then model
the credit imperfections in housing markets and
assess the possibility of beneficial government in-
tervention. Finally, Anjan Thakor and Jess Beltz
look at the political economy behind rules that
target bank credit toward specific groups.
Berger and Udell
In "Did Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit
and Cause a 'Credit Crunch' in the United
States?" Allen Berger and Gregory Udell investi-
gate the reallocation of bank credit from loans
to securities in the early 1990s. In searching for
the cause of this portfolio shift, they test a vari-
ety of possibilities, including the imposition of
risk-based capital requirements, tougher loan
examinations, increased leverage requirements,
and several nonregulation-based reasons. Ber-
ger and Udell are the first to examine all of
these competing theories simultaneously.
The study utilizes an extensive data set cov-
ering quarterly numbers on almost all U.S. com-
mercial banks between 1979 and 1992. It is
also distinguished by the use of a control pe-
riod that lets the authors determine if the early
1990s look different enough to merit designa-
tion as a "credit crunch." To do this, Berger
and Udell estimate a series of supply equationsfor bank credit and then test for differences in
credit behavior between the crunch period and
the control period.
They also compare the portfolio allocation
decisions of well-capitalized banks with those
of undercapitalized banks, since a number of
the hypotheses predict differences in portfolio
allocation effects across these subsamples.
How the supply equations shift allows Berger
and Udell to distinguish between the compet-
ing theories.
The results provide little support for most of
the supply-side theories of bank portfolio shifts
in the early 1990s. For example, the estimated
supply equations show that banks with low
risk-based capital ratios did not reduce their
lending or increase their securities between the
control period and credit crunch more than did
banks with higher risk-based capital ratios. The
other supply-side stories provide a better expla-
nation than risk-based capital, but still seem
quantitatively unimportant. The demand-side
theories fare better, though perhaps only be-
cause their effects are harder to pin down with
banking data.
Berger and Udell's conclusions differ from
previous work showing that risk-based capital
requirements significantly alter banks' portfolio
behavior, such as Haubrich and Wachtel (1993).
Much of the discrepancy probably can be traced
to different empirical methods. Berger and Udell
stress the importance of the control period and
of assessing a credit crunch only in relation to
the control. By claiming that a credit crunch oc-
curs only if the loan supply function differs be-
tween the crunch and the control, the paper
drives this point too far. The imposition of risk-
based capital requirements has increased the
number of capital-constrained banks; these in-
stitutions then reacted to the constraints. The
behavior of a capital-constrained bank during
the control period, however, need not differ
from the actions of one facing risk-based stan-
dards. Tough regulators could have caused the
problem either because they got tougher or be-
cause banking conditions exposed their inher-
ent toughness. This is really the old economic
distinction between movements along a supply
curve versus movements of a supply curve. A
decrease in demand can cause a reduction in
equilibrium quantity even if the supply curve
does not shift.
Merwan Engineer provides a thoughtful
commentary on the Berger and Udell paper. He
correctly points out that since risk-based capi-
tal guidelines were imposed internationally, a
comparison with other countries may help to
resolve the issue in dispute. He also points out
that a common problem is estimating supply
equations for heavily regulated industries such
as banking: Heavy regulation generally means
that supply relations change frequently, making
it difficult to get a fix on them. In the case at
hand, variables measuring bank risk influence
bank portfolio choice via regulatory behavior,
so when regulations change, the estimated rela-
tion should change. Finally, he argues that the
issues considered fit into a broader context that
was not raised in the paper: Were the new-
capital standards wise, and if so, were they
adopted at the right time?
Calomiris, Kahn,
and Longhofer
In "Housing-Finance Intervention and Private
Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor,"
Charles Calomiris, Charles Kahn, and Stanley
Longhofer look at the goals behind govern-
ment housing programs, the possible market
imperfections that may justify such interven-
tion, and the costs and benefits of the interven-
tion. Economists typically fall back onto equity
and efficiency issues when undertaking such
an analysis of government programs. Unfortu-
nately, while equity is the main motivator of
government housing intervention, equity (un-
like economic efficiency) is a slippery concept
with different meanings for different individu-
als. Consequently, even though efficiency is
the main yardstick for examining federal hous-
ing intervention, Calomiris et al. provide the
reader with a framework for understanding the
equity issues. They define three types of equity
— equitable procedures, equal outcomes, and
retributive justice — and illustrate how each
may imply a different form of intervention or
program design.
After providing an overview of the different
types of housing interventions, the authors out-
line four different classes of housing market
problems that government interventions could
be designed to solve: wealth inequality and
poverty, informational externalities, bigotry,
and rational discrimination. Although the is-
sues and relevant literature on each class of
problem are reviewed, the presentation deals
mainly with rational discrimination.
Rational discrimination in housing finance
arises from informational asymmetries associ-
ated with evaluating mortgage applications. At
each stage of the credit evaluation of an appli-
cant, the lender must determine whether tocontinue collecting information or to stop (that
is, to deny the loan). Calomiris et al. argue that
if nonminority loan officers find it harder to in-
terpret signals from minorities, then they must
make the loan relying on fewer informative sig-
nals, and the bank both denies a larger share
of minority loan applications and faces a higher
degree of minority default. As a result, the
lender's costs of processing minority applications
are higher and its expected return is lower.
Therefore, lenders will employ more conserva-
tive stopping rules to minority applications.
This is obviously discrimination, since other-
wise identical minority and nonminority appli-
cants face different probabilities of receiving
credit. It is rational because the higher denial
rate is not a function of bigotry, but rather is
based on the lender's private benefits and
costs associated with information collection.
The rational discrimination model is particu-
larly interesting because it resolves the "Becker
paradox." If minorities face discrimination, the
paradox ains, they should have lower default
rates than whites, since banks lend only to ultra-
safe minority borrowers. This contradicts the evi-
dence, which shows that minorities have higher
default rates than do whites, even after controlling
for all of the relevant economic variables. The
empirical evidence, however, is consistent with
Calomiris et al.'s rational discrimination model.
In a review of some recent evidence on dis-
crimination in mortgage markets, the authors
find that most of the formal and informal evi-
dence is consistent with rational discrimination.
Moreover, they argue that explanations such as
cultural affinity or bigotry cannot explain the poor
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) ratings of
minority-owned banks. However, to the extent that
minorities face educational disadvantages and have
lower average wealth than society in general, the
poor CRA ratings of minority-owned firms are not
inconsistent with rational discrimination.
If what we observe in housing finance mar-
kets is indeed rational discrimination, then what
is the appropriate policy response by govern-
ment? Calomiris et al. conclude that subsidized
community development banks appear to be
the most efficient solution.
Robert Van Order's critique of the Calomiris
paper provides some useful insights on both the
issue of discrimination and the analysis of dis-
crimination. Van Order questions the usefulness
of empirical studies of mortgage discrimination
because of the omitted-variables problem. If ex-
planatory variables omitted from the regression
experiment are correlated with race, biases are
introduced in the race coefficient of the logit
regression. Therefore, considerably more work
is needed before strong conclusions can be
drawn from these studies. Van Order also ques-
tions conclusions about the "Becker paradox"
drawn from mortgage default rates. He points
out that the proposition is based on the default
rate of the marginal borrower, not the average
one, and that the "econometric problems of iso-
lating what is marginal are formidable."
Van Order suggests that the model of rational
discrimination is consistent with commission-
based compensation for lending officers. When
commissions are based on the number of appli-
cations processed that meet underwriting stan-
dards, lending officers find efficient ways to
allocate their time. These include stopping rules
based on variables that have been found to be
correlated with the creditworthiness of the bor-
rower, including race. Van Order argues that ra-
tional discrimination can be dealt with through
the same testing and enforcement mechanisms
used to counteract bigotry.
He also makes a useful distinction between
community lending issues and issues of dis-
crimination. Distinguishing between these two
is important because the solutions may be
quite different. On one hand, community lend-
ing issues are about channeling funds into de-
pressed areas. Van Order notes that the prob-
lem here is not necessarily one of race but
rather of neighborhood externalities. On the
other hand, he suggests that discrimination is
most serious for middle-class blacks, most of
whom do not live in depressed areas. In his
view, one of the problems with CRA is that it
does not distinguish between these two some-
times conflicting issues and therefore does a
poor job of solving either one.
Thakor and Beltz
In "A 'Barter' Theory of Bank Regulation and
Credit Allocation," Anjan Thakor and Jess Beltz
advance the discussion of government involve-
ment in credit markets beyond market failure
and instead attempt to understand the self-
interested motives behind these interventions.
They posit that the existing complex web of
regulatory subsidies and taxes is the outcome
of what starts out as a mutually beneficial bar-
ter arrangement.
In their model, government subsidies bene-
fit banks more than they cost taxpayers. In re-
turn, banks allow the government to dictate
some aspects of their credit allocation. For ex-
ample, they may accept the CRA in exchangefor deposit insurance and access to the discount
window. This barter arrangement is a dynamic
one, however, with the costs of government
intervention increasing as new regulations are
needed to counteract banks' circumvention of
the original statutes.
Such a regulatory exchange can be mutually
beneficial as long as the subsidy exceeds the
cost of regulation. If a subset of banks finds
this barter arrangement unprofitable, then a
bad Nash equilibrium arises, which Thakor
and Beltz call a regulatory trap. A bank opting
out of the system would not attract any deposi-
tors, who prefer institutions covered by deposit
insurance. This holds true as long as some
banks find the regulatory barter process to be
profitable. The banking system as a whole may
prefer to give up deposit insurance when credit
allocation regulations become too imposing,
but a coordination problem prevents this.
Thakor and Beltz's basic model is a two-
period one in which all agents are risk averse.
There are three types of borrowers: the good
(G), the bad (B), and the underprivileged (U).
Only G borrowers have positive net-present-
value projects in which to invest. The bank
cannot distinguish between G and B borrow-
ers, but it can readily identify the U's. Without
government intervention, banks would never
lend to U borrowers.
All projects last one period, and banks can in-
fer the borrower type by the realized return on
the first-period project. Only G borrowers with
successful first-period projects obtain financing in
the second period. Finally, successful G borrow-
ers in the second period may have only a risky
project to invest in or a choice between a risky
project and a higher-valued safe one. However,
only the lending bank in the first period can dis-
tinguish between borrowers with and without a
choice of second-period projects. This is an im-
portant assumption because depositors will price
their deposits according to the perceived attri-
butes of the bank's portfolio. The inability of de-
positors to see the banker's private information
and the incentives banks have to misrepresent
their information on borrowers lead to a higher
deposit rate than would be obtained in the full
information case. Unfortunately, at this higher de-
posit rate, the banker cannot offer borrowers with
a project choice a lending rate that will make the
safe project profitable. Hence, the agency con-
flict both prevents the bank from exploiting its
proprietary information and distorts investment.
In this model, government provision of a fi-
nancial safety net through deposit insurance is
Pareto improving. Deposit insurance solves the
agency conflict between depositors and the
banks arising from informational asymmetries by
making deposits riskless. As a result, deposit
insurance allows a bank to earn rents on its mo-
nopoly information in the second period by al-
lowing it to price its loans according to borrower
characteristics. Lower interest rates can be of-
fered to borrowers along with an option to in-
vest in the safe project, thus making the choice
of the more highly valued safe project optimal.
Consequently, deposit insurance removes the
second-period investment distortion arising from
informational asymmetries. Finally, if deposit in-
surance is underpriced, then banks and borrow-
ers share in the surplus that results. However,
given that the deposit insurance subsidy is avail-
able to banks that invest their deposits in market-
able securities, a barter agreement between banks
and the government becomes feasible.
The final element in Thakor and Beltz's
analysis is the introduction of lending to U bor-
rowers as a political good. Then, as a condition
for insurance, the government mandates that
banks lend a fixed portion of their deposits to
U borrowers. Banks are willing to enter into
this contract as long as the increase in profits
from access to deposit insurance exceeds the
cost of complying with the lending regulation.
Thakor and Beltz then show that if this bar-
ter arrangement becomes unprofitable over
time for a subset of banks, these institutions
will be trapped into maintaining the arrange-
ment as long as other banks find it profitable
to continue. This regulatory trap arises because
the profits of the trapped banks are conditional
on the actions of the nontrapped institutions.
Unilaterally dropping deposit insurance would
lower a bank's profits if other banks do not fol-
low and instead retain their insurance. This oc-
curs because the bank dropping its insurance
will have higher funding costs than the insured
institution and therefore will be unable to com-
pete in the lending market. However, all banks
could profit if the barter arrangement were
dropped (that is, if they all canceled their insur-
ance) and side payments were made from the
trapped banks to the untrapped ones. This so-
lution is precluded by coordination problems.
The essence of the Thakor/Beltz analysis is
that social regulation and financial safety net
subsidies go hand in hand. It is therefore unre-
alistic to argue for a reduction in the regulatory
burden without a reduction in the subsidies. It
is also impractical to think that one can extend
social regulation to nonbank financial firms
without also providing them access to deposit
insurance and the discount window.In her comments on Thakor and Beltz's pa-
per, Deborah Lucas raises a number of valid
concerns about the analysis. First, she correctly
notes that the government could unilaterally
impose regulations on the banking industry
without offering special subsidies. Therefore,
the authors need to explain why banks are dif-
ferent from industries such as automobile man-
ufacturers, who face costly regulations (fuel
efficiency standards, for instance) but do not
appear to be compensated. In the absence of
such an explanation, the barter theory seems
less justified than a straight regulatory tax story.
Lucas also raises questions about the robust-
ness of the Thakor/Beltz results to different
modeling assumptions. As she notes, by intro-
ducing subsidized deposit insurance as a means
of solving the monitoring problem, the authors
produce an outcome in which deposit insurance
lowers bank risk. This, of course, is at odds
with the option-pricing approach to valuing de-
posit insurance and the attendant moral hazard
problem, which leads to increased bank risk
(Merton [1977]).
Finally, Lucas agrees with the authors' con-
clusions regarding the implications of the bad
Nash equilibrium and that banks as a whole
could benefit by opting out of the unprofitable
barter arrangement. However, she points out
that if the story is not one of barter but rather
a simpler one of regulatory taxes, then the
same policy conclusions may not apply.
III. Session 3:
Pensions
The third and final session takes a more in-depth
look at a particular area — pensions — where
federal programs may have a huge impact on
both individual fortunes and economywide vari-
ables. Indeed, the parallels between the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) are at times uncanny. Like the savings
and loan debacle, the large and growing contin-
gent liabilities of the PBGC have the potential to
strike a public nerve — as does the cost of any
bailout. The two papers in this session offer a
somewhat different perspective on an aspect of
federal credit allocation: that of ascertaining the
facts. The answers are not always easy to obtain,
even to straightforward questions such as
"How much do people contribute to their pen-
sions?" or "How valuable is PBGC insurance?"
Gale
William Gale offers a new look at the determi-
nants of pension contributions in "Public Poli-
cies and Private Pension Contributions," which
provides the reader with a synthesis of the lit-
erature on pensions and pension contributions.
Many aspects of the contribution decision —
tax deducibility, benefit guarantees, and vest-
ing rules — depend on government regulations,
especially the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Uncovering the
smoking gun that links shifts in policy with
shifts in contributions has been difficult, in part
because the data on private pension contribu-
tions are sparse. Moreover, shifts in demo-
graphics during the 1970s and 1980s further
cloud the issue.
Gale provides the reader with some insights
into the issues surrounding pensions by exam-
ining changes in the legal and regulatory envi-
ronment as well as trends in pension coverage,
pension plan choice (defined benefit versus de-
fined contribution), and funding status over
time. He then sorts out what the literature has
to say about these recent trends and the role
that government intervention into the nation's
pension markets has played. For example,
ERISA was a major force in the shift by employ-
ers from defined benefit to defined contribu-
tion plans. However, the pension literature
points to changes in industrial composition and
employment as two other important factors ex-
plaining the shift in plan choice.
In seeking to understand the determinants of
private pension contributions, Gale is faced
with isolating the effects of government inter-
vention into the nation's pension markets using
data that are fragmented and inconsistent over
time. To deal with this issue, he estimates his
empirical model using two different sets of data.
First, he uses standard data from the National In-
come and Product Accounts (NIPA). Unfortunate-
ly, the NIPA data are inadequate because they
omit employee contributions, which are a grow-
ing and important share of total contributions. To
control for this deficiency, Gale constructs a sec-
ond measure of pension contributions by piecing
together the standard NIPA figures both with
IRS Form 5500 reports from private pension
plans and with a new Brookings Institution se-
ries. With this improved, comprehensive series
in hand, real contributions per worker are cor-
related with earnings, per capita asset holdings,
the previous year's contributions, and dummy
variables for various regulatory episodes.Gale's empirical results highlight the inade-
quacy of standard data sets such as the NIPA.
Time-series regressions using the dependent
variable constructed from NIPA data reveal no
evidence that ERISA or the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA87) had any
effect on real pension contributions. Yet, when
the dependent variable is taken from Gale's
"constructed measure," both are shown to be
significant factors affecting private pension con-
tributions. The study finds that ERISA increased
annual real contributions by an average of $213
per person and that OBRA87 reduced contribu-
tions by $154.
One caveat on the regressions using the
constructed measure of real contributions per
worker is that both ERISA and OBRA87 occur
close to the sample dates at which data from
different sources were spliced together. There-
fore, the ERISA and OBRA87 dummy variables
could be proxying for rules that Gale used to
arrive at his constructed measure.
In his review of Gale's work, Joseph Ritter
notes that private pensions are part of the com-
pensation packages offered by some firms and
as such may be an important part of the struc-
ture of incentives used to motivate w
rorkers.
In other words, there may be much more to
pensions than their impact on the structure of
compensation and the composition of private
savings. Consequently, government policies af-
fecting private pensions may have important
spillover effects on labor and capital markets.
Ritter ultimately finds the paper to be inter-
esting, well motivated, and a useful survey of
data sources, legal and regulatory changes, and
empirical evidence. Moreover, he finds the em-
pirical tests to be appropriate and well exe-
cuted. He does question the robustness of the
results, however, because the dependent vari-
able (employee composition) is constructed
four different ways across time. Unfortunately,
the shifts in how employee composition is con-
structed tend to coincide with the events Gale
is studying.
Pennacchi and Lewis
George Pennacchi and Christopher Lewis seek
to determine "The Value of Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation Insurance" by modeling
PBCG guarantees as a put option with a stochas-
tic exercise date. At first sight, this may seem like
a lot of machinery for one number, but the num-
ber lies at the heart of the PBGC problem. Evalu-
ating the PBGC's assets and liabilities lets us
know if the insurance fund is healthy, totter-
ing, or another FSLIC waiting to explode.
Meiton (1977) shows that financial guaran-
tees like PBGC insurance can be modeled as a
put option (that is, the right but not the obligation
to sell a stock at a predetermined price). To value
a standard put option, however, one must know
the exercise price and the exercise date, w
rhich
for pension guarantees are unknown. Unfortu-
nately, while reliable estimates of the exercise
price can be obtained, the exercise date cannot
be predicted accurately. To resolve this problem,
Marcus (1987) values PBGC liabilities as a futures
contract with a maturity equal to the time of the
sponsoring firm's (pension plan's) bankruptcy.
This futures contract model for valuing PBGC
guarantees links the value of the guarantee to
both the financial condition of the pension fund
and the likelihood that the sponsoring firm will
become bankrupt.
Pennacchi and Lewis take a different tack.
Using a continuous-time options-valuation ap-
proach, they value PBGC guarantees as a put
option with an uncertain exercise date. They
thus extend Marcus' model in an important
way. Futures contracts are different from op-
tions because they represent an obligation to
buy or sell an underlying asset at a future date,
as opposed to the right to carry out the transac-
tion. Consequently, Marcus' formula for valu-
ing pension guarantees implicitly assumes that
the PBGC would experience a gain whenever a
bankrupt firm's pension plan w
ras overfunded.
Pennacchi and Lewis' put-option formula ex-
plicitly recognizes that the PBGC's guarantee is
contingent on both a firm's bankruptcy and its
pension plan being underfunded, or insolvent.
Pennacchi and Lewis add another important
wrinkle to valuing PBGC guarantees. They at-
tempt to control for the firm's ability to in-
crease its pension liabilities in the period just
preceding bankruptcy.
3 To do this, they gross
up the firm's pension liabilities by a factor X.
The study shows that the value, at time zero,
of the PBGC guarantee on one dollar of accrued
pension liability is a positive function of X and of
the ratio of grossed-up pension liabilities to pen-
sion assets. The value of the PBGC guarantee is
a negative function of the time remaining until
the firm goes bankrupt.
• 3 A firm's ability to adjust its balance sheet dynamically in response to
external events is what Ritchken et al. (1993) call the flexibility option.After solving for the value of a put option
with a random exercise date contingent on
firm bankruptcy, Pennacchi and Lewis use
some representative parameter values to calcu-
late the PBGC's liabilities and to conduct some
comparative statics exercises. The exercises
show that the put option model always yields
higher pension costs than does Marcus' futures
contract model.
For firms with low pension funding ratios
and low net worth, Marcus' model appears to
be a good approximation of the put. This is
simply because a put option that is "deep in
the money" (one that is almost certain to be ex-
ercised) is very similar to a futures contract.
The bias in the Marcus model increases along
with a firm's net worth. Interestingly, this is be-
cause a high level of net worth gives a firm
with an overfunded pension plan time to un-
derfund it. For similar reasons, the bias also
rises with the pension-funding-to-liability ratio.
Andrew Chen's follow-up discussion points
to the contingent put option model of PBGC in-
surance as an important contribution to the
pension literature. He notes that the compara-
tive statics performed by Pennacchi and Lewis
provide useful insights into the properties of
the PBGC and produce results consistent with
economic intuition.
Overall, Chen finds the Pennacchi/Lewis
paper to be an important contribution to the liter-
ature, but suggests that the analysis is incomplete.
While Pennacchi and Lewis' model is a clear
improvement of Marcus' futures contract model,
Chen raises five questions about the model and
its assumptions. His strongest criticisms are that
Pennacchi and Lewis ignore taxes in their analysis
and do not look at the volatility of pension as-
sets. Chen argues that a complete analysis of
PBGC guarantees must account for the tax factor,
which is a major determinant of corporate pension
asset and funding decisions. Furthermore, he sug-
gests that the comparative statics for the volatility
of pension assets must be explored.
Chen also offers some other less serious criti-
cisms of the analysis. First, he finds the authors'
use of market-value insolvency as a proxy for
bankruptcy to be inconsistent with the legal defini-
tion of bankruptcy (a firm's inability to meet its
contractual payments obligation). Second, he ar-
gues that the assumption underlying scaling up
pension liabilities at termination by a factor A, is
inconsistent with the empirical evidence found in
Bodie et al. (1987), which suggests that eleventh-
hour increases in pension liabilities are uncommon.
Finally, he questions whether modeling PBGC
guarantees as an infinite-maturity option is
superior to a one-period option with an uncer-
tain exercise price.
IV. Conclusion
Each paper presented at the conference illumi-
nates some important aspect of federal credit
allocation. Taken together, they illustrate the
range and significance of the government's in-
tervention into the broad credit market. Some
of the work has practical applications already,
such as valuing and quantifying the effects of
regulations. Collectively, the papers might best
be thought of as a series of warnings: Some sim-
ple insights and obvious stories turn out to be
untrue; some easy solutions don't work. Taken
as a body, the papers also point to three unre-
solved issues that demand attention:
1) How important are racism, credit ration-
ing, and other imperfections in the credit market?
2) Given credit market imperfections, what
is the best means of resolving the problems —
regulations, taxes and subsidies, or govern-
ment organizations?
3) How will actual, as opposed to ideal, so-
lutions work in the real-world political and eco-
nomic environment?
The overriding normative question about
the desired extent of government intervention
remains open. We believe that the papers pre-
sented here provide both a direction and a
springboard for needed future research.References
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